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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
   SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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   PARENTS DEFENDING EDUCATION,
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                             Plaintiff,
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                                             24 CV 4485 (CS)
        -vs-
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                                             CONFERENCE
   CROTON-HARMON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
   et al.,
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                             Defendants.
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                                  United States Courthouse
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                                  White Plains, New York
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                                  July 11, 2024
13 Before: THE HONORABLE CATHY SEIBEL,
                                  District Judge
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15 APPEARANCES:
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   STEVEN C. STERN
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   ALSO PRESENT:
23
   Abigail Needleman, Intern with Sokoloff Stern
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   *Proceedings recorded via digital recording device*
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OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
DARBY GINSBERG, RPR, RCR (914) 390-4102

THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. Parents Defending 2 Education v. Croton-Harmon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Vitagliano. Am I 4 saying it right?

MR. VITAGLIANO: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Mr. Stern and Ms. Needleman. Everyone can 7 have a seat.

I have letters, and I have questions. The unusual 9 posture where the plaintiff wants me to deny its motion and 10 dismiss its case, and the defendant at least doesn't want me to 11 do that yet.

But I guess my first question is for you, Mr. Stern. 13 Why shouldn't I just do that and save you and the taxpayers the 14 trouble of litigating this case? Unless you think the 15 plaintiffs have standing.

MR. STERN: No, I don't, Your Honor.

So I reached out to plaintiff's counsel to ask for the 18 normal extension of time and was kind of surprised to hear the 19 response. So we are sort of -- it was -- there are two aspects to it: One, you know, your time is up now. So I wanted that 21 \parallel extension of time to answer; and two, we are going to ask the Court -- and I didn't know exactly how that would come in, how 23 \parallel that application would be presented -- we are going to ask the 24 Court to dismiss the case.

Obviously, I want the Court to dismiss the case.

1 agree with them that they lack standing under Second Circuit precedent, and I obviously disagree with them that that 3 precedent was incorrectly decided. But I also, in looking at this, it seems to me that what they are really doing is they are 5 making an application for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, 6 and that's what their papers say. So to that extent, I haven't answered yet that I don't know that I have the -- I have the standing to object to that.

THE COURT: It sounds like they want me to dismiss it 10 so that they have something to appeal, and that causes me to turn to Mr. Vitagliano.

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What's really going on here? I mean, this issue is --13 has been decided by the Circuit in the Do No Harm case. At 14 \parallel first I looked at this, and I thought, well, obviously, your 15 firm doesn't think that whosever representing the plaintiffs in that case is going to do a good job on the appeal, but then I 17 | learned that it's your firm. So what do you need this case for? Clearly, you want to get this issue up to the Supreme Court. 19 You've got a vehicle for doing it. What's the point of this case?

MR. VITAGLIANO: Your Honor, our clients, Parents 22 Defending Education, are currently suffering First Amendment 23 harms right now and under that binding precedent --

THE COURT: You are going to get an answer on whether they have standing or not faster through your other client than

1 through this client. If you succeed in the Do No Harm case in getting either the Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court to say 3 that the Second Circuit's decision is wrong, you can be here the next day on behalf of anybody who's got standing at that time. 5 But there's no way this case is going to leapfrog that one. So 6 I don't -- I don't understand the strategy.

MR. VITAGLIANO: There is a Second --

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THE COURT: It's not necessary that I do, but it just seems like the same lawyers are going to be making the same 10 | arguments, and you are going to get where you want to get, which is either an en banc or the Supreme Court sooner in that other case.

MR. VITAGLIANO: Regardless of how Do No Harm vs. 14 | Pfizer is decided before the Second Circuit en banc, whether it grants rehearing or not, there is still a second precedent, Aguayo vs. Richardson, that also forecloses PBE from obtaining 17 relief.

THE COURT: But wasn't that also relied on in the Do 19 No Harm case?

MR. VITAGLIANO: So the -- so the panel opinion in Do 21 \parallel No Harm effectively vacated any ruling on that, and that was a different issue because in Do No Harm it was a Section 1981 23 claim, which presented a novel application of Aguayo, whereas 24 here, it's a straightforward 1983 case that is squarely foreclosed by Aguayo.

THE COURT: How old a case is Aquayo?

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MR. VITAGLIANO: I believe the '70s. It was a Judge 3 Friendly opinion.

THE COURT: I don't think you are going to get 5 anywhere with an en banc on that, although, of course, in this 6 Supreme Court who knows because now decades-old precedents don't 7 mean anything.

But even the best-case scenario -- well, as I understand it, one of the members of your organization doesn't 10 have a kid in the schools anymore, and the other two are going to graduate, I infer from the argument, within a year -- oh, yeah, here is Aquayo was in 1973. You know, I don't see -- and maybe there are other members of this organization who will 14 ripen into parents who have kids in the school.

The only thing I didn't understand is the complaint says that the parents want to remain anonymous because if it was 17 known who they were and who their children were, they would -they fear either that the School District will take it out on 19 their kids that the parents filed this lawsuit, or they just don't want to -- and I guess I should say -- they don't want to 21 \parallel suffer the grief they are going to suffer from people who think their positions are bigoted or whatever, and I didn't understand 23 that at all. Because, I mean, I don't think anybody really 24 seriously thinks that a school district would punish a student 25 \parallel who hadn't done anything because of something the parents did

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And if the parents, what they are suing for is they 3 want their kids to have the right to express unpopular views in school, then it seems inconsistent for them to say, we don't 5 want it to be known who we are because we have unpopular views. 6 In other words, we want to remain anonymous so that we don't get grief for our unpopular views, but what we are suing for is our desire to express our unpopular views. So both can't be true. If you want to express the views, you know what comes with that, and then it seems to me you should be fine with being -- with being named.

MR. VITAGLIANO: I think those concerns would arise in different contexts, Your Honor. So, for example, take a class 14 discussion, a student expresses one small view on one issue 15 whereas now if their identities were disclosed through this 16 litigation, it sets forth in the declarations a whole host of 17 | views that many in the School District and community may find unpopular or may seek to retaliate against them for.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that it really matters at this stage, but if it ever gets to the point of depositions, it will be very interesting because I don't see how you really reconcile, "I don't want anyone to know that I am bringing a 23 | lawsuit because I am expressing unpopular views, and the purpose 24 of my lawsuit is so that I and my children can express unpopular views." But --

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MR. STERN: I don't know how we get to take these depositions if we are never allowed to learn the identity of the 3 members of the organization.

THE COURT: At the very least if we went to a PI 5 hearing, these individuals would have to take the stand and 6 explain that inconsistency. So the one little opening I saw in the plaintiff's papers was that essentially if I promised that they could remain anonymous forever, they would consider telling me their names, you know. It doesn't solve anything.

But I think -- and you will correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Vitagliano -- you are not looking to voluntarily dismiss. 12 You want me to dismiss because you want to be able to have something to appeal; is that correct?

MR. VITAGLIANO: That is correct. Yes. We are not 15 ∥actually not seeking to voluntarily dismiss our case because we are still pursuing the underlying First Amendment violations. 17 We understand we would need to overcome precedence on appeal; and you know, we would only seek to litigate the First Amendment 19 issues if this case were turned on appeal or after those precedents that stand in our way are no more.

MR. STERN: That's not the way that it works, Your 22 Honor. I mean, a litigant can come into court and make an 23 | argument, you know, that existing precedent was wrongly decided 24 or for an extension of existing law, but to come into court and say -- not say, hey, Judge, we want you to decide it this way

1 because either the precedent is distinguishable or it's wrong, 2 and look at these other circuits and, you know, Judge, go out on $3 \parallel$ a limb here and decide the case the way that we believe it 4 should be decided on the issue of standing. But they actually 5 came in and said, we want it just dismissed. That's different. 6 That's a voluntary dismissal, and they are asking for it without prejudice. So --

THE COURT: Well, it would have to be without prejudice because they lack standing, meaning I don't have 10 subject matter jurisdiction, meaning I can't dismiss anything with prejudice, and don't I have -- apart from what they want --12 an independent obligation to assure that I have subject matter jurisdiction? And here, I am pretty sure I don't.

MR. VITAGLIANO: I agree. We agree.

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THE COURT: Well, I -- you know, look, the -- whether there is -- I don't think that what they've done is unethical. 17 You know, they put their cards on the table. They are not trying to trick anyone. It does feel a little -- a little like 19 gamesmanship, but how do -- if you are the Parents Defending Education, how do you tee this issue up other than how they are doing it?

MR. STERN: I mean, you bring, you bring a lawsuit, 23 and you argue for your position as opposed to arguing that, hey, 24 district court, you should decide against me. I mean, that's 25 seems like a Rule 11 problem.

THE COURT: These parents could not be anonymous, and then they could bring this case. That's really the answer. 2 3 MR. STERN: They could bring it on their -potentially on their own behalf or on their child's behalf, but 5 still they lack organizational standing under Aquayo. THE COURT: Well, if you are an organization, and you 6 want to challenge Aquayo, what other way is there for them to do that except to do what they are doing here? 9 MR. STERN: Well, again, they could do it in similar 10 | fashion without saying, we want you to find against us, which is what they have done here. They should --12 (Cross-talk) 13 THE COURT: Maybe they are doing the right thing by 14 \parallel saying, we admit you have to find against us. I'm not sure that's a distinction with a difference. 16 But I also don't see any reason why I shouldn't grant the mutual wishes of both parties: Deny the motion and dismiss the case, and then let the appellate folks duke it out. 18 19 MR. STERN: Grant the motion. 20 THE COURT: Sorry? 21 MR. STERN: Grant the motion to dismiss the case. 22 THE COURT: What did I say? 23 MR. STERN: Deny. 24 THE COURT: I didn't mean that. And, frankly, I am 25 \parallel not even sure it's a motion. Nobody has actually made a motion.

1 I think what I am doing actually is I am concluding I lack 2 subject matter jurisdiction, and I am dismissing without 3 prejudice. I am denying the PI motion. That's what I am denying. I'm not -- but I'm not granting a motion dismiss 5 because there hasn't been one. I'm writing this down so I get 6 it right.

I'm denying the PI motion and dismissing the case without prejudice because I lack subject matter jurisdiction.

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On plaintiff's application. MR. STERN:

THE COURT: And I can deny -- I can deny the motion even though -- the PI motion, even though I lack subject matter jurisdiction. That's what happened in Do No Harm, right?

MR. VITAGLIANO: Correct. Yes. The motion for 14 preliminary injunction would be denied, and the case would need to be dismissed. That's exactly what Pfizer says. Your Honor, 16 we would just wish, respectfully request that you also give us 17 the alternative ruling under Aquayo, so we can take that precedent up on appeal as well. It would be doing so in the 19 interest of judicial economy. It would save resources for both the parties, their attorneys, this Court, because if we were to go up only on the Do No Harm vs. Pfizer case, regardless what happens, Aquayo still stands in the way. If we prevail and 23 overturn Do No Harm vs. Pfizer, we come back down. Aguayo 24 stands in the way. If we do not succeed in overturning Do No 25 Harm vs. Pfizer, we come back or dismissal would be without

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1 prejudice. We could then re-file, not seek a preliminary injunction, and Aguayo still forecloses relief, which would then 3 require a whole 'nother round of appellate proceedings en banc, possibly Supreme Court review.

If I could just add, Your Honor, counsel suggested 6 that there is a Rule 11 issue. There is no Rule 11 issue, and I know it may seem like an unusual posture, but in cases like this that are brought specifically to overturn a precedent, I think it's very forthcoming to just concede defeat. The Janus case that was before the Supreme Court a few years ago, plaintiffs there conceded defeat and dismissal in response to a motion to 12 dismiss, and I would also direct Your Honor to the County of Westchester case, which we cite in our briefing that was before 14 Judge Halpern. The plaintiff there challenged a Westchester County ordinance, conceded defeat under Supreme Court precedent in the complaint. The County then filed a pre-motion letter to 17 move to dismiss, and the plaintiff conceded in response to the pre-motion letter that we agree we lose. You can dispense with 19 formal briefing, and that's exactly what Judge Halpern did, and he dismissed it under the binding Supreme Court precedent.

THE COURT: I mean, I am expressing no opinion about I don't have a motion in front of me, and I don't see 23 a need to go down that road. As I said, I don't think plaintiff's counsel has hidden the ball in any way.

I mean, look, it looks to me like I lack subject

1 matter jurisdiction under either Do No Harm vs. Pfizer or Aquayo 2 vs. Richardson because the former says an association has to 3 dentify at least one injured member to establish standing, and 4 plaintiff has not done that. And Aguayo says that organizations 5 can't bring 1983 suits on behalf of their members, and that's 6 what they are trying to do. So there's two reasons I lack 7 standing -- not I lack standing, plaintiffs lack standing. Why 8 I lack subject matter jurisdiction.

What the higher courts want to do with that, I will 10 | leave to them. I am still not really getting how -- how this is going to get resolved in time for parents A and B, who I think 12 said it's -- maybe I am wrong, but I thought their children were going to be seniors. But should either or both of those 14 precedents be overturned and should there be members of 15 plaintiff's organization at that time who want to pursue this 16 issue, and should those people have standing, then we will 17 revisit.

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Just out of curiosity, you mentioned, Mr. Stern, that 19 the schools' policies basically, at least in large part, track what the State requires.

MR. STERN: That's DASA. I haven't done a complete side-by-side yet, but that's my understanding they largely track 23 DASA.

THE COURT: So is your beef -- your client's beef 25∥really with School District or is it with the State of New York 3

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1 that requires school districts to have policies like the one you are challenging?

MR. VITAGLIANO: It's with the School District directly. As my friend on the other side, I haven't done the 5 side-by-side comparison, just we know that our client's members, 6 their children are currently in public schools, and they are currently suffering First Amendment harms because of Croton's policies.

THE COURT: I also noticed it looked like a lot of the 10 "brave horribles" in your complaint were from schools around the country. Did you have anything in here about how this District 12 is enforcing those policies? And I understand you are arguing that just the existence of the policies is chilling your 14 clients' speech, but there was some discussion about ways in 15 which some schools have enforced their policies that you obviously wanted to be part of your case.

MR. VITAGLIANO: Just a broader issue around the country, and Parents Defending Education has litigated cases 19 like this around the country against similar speech policies and has been very successful.

I direct Your Honor to the Linn Mar case that we cite 22 in our briefing, as well as the *Olentangy* case that we cite in 23 our briefing.

THE COURT: Was there anything in your complaint about Croton-Harmon and how they are enforcing their policies?

MR. VITAGLIANO: As to specific instances of enforcement, I am not sure, but that's not required for pre-3 enforcement standing.

THE COURT: I understand. I was --

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MR. STERN: I don't believe there is, Judge, reading 6 through the complaint. And there is also a lot of information in the -- extraneous information about the complaint about, you know, certain political issues and political beliefs that don't seem to be implicated in any way by the School District's 10 policies one way or another.

THE COURT: Well, it sounded like the parents -- and 12 maybe their children have -- and I don't know if this is just 13 hypothetical or real -- but if they had a trans teacher who 14 wanted to be called "Mr", but the plaintiffs thought there is no 15 such thing and therefore, they wanted to call that teacher "Ms" or "Miss" or "Mrs" and not use the person's preferred honorific, 17 | that that would be a violation of their First Amendment rights. I don't know if that's real or made up, and I don't know why 19 it's a big deal, frankly, but it's not my -- it's not my opinion that matters.

You know, if your kid -- let's say there was a teacher who was married but wanted to be called "Ms", and the kids 23 insisted on calling her "Mrs" for whatever reason, not using 24 their preferred -- the teacher's preferred term, aside from it just being sort of gratuitously disrespectful, would it run

1 afoul of any of the rules?

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Is it your clients' position, Mr. Vitagliano, that it 3 would?

MR. VITAGLIANO: It may because a lot of the policies 5 turn on the subjective perception of the listener, and if it 6 causes them offense, then the student very well could be punished.

And I would just add, Your Honor, as we explained in the supplemental declaration, the School District doubled down 10 \parallel on all of its policies in response to the complaint. They issued a public statement that it prides itself on not 12 permitting this type of unfavored or unpopular speech. So I think it's quite clear that it intends to enforce its policies, 14 and it does see an issue with what's outlined in the complaints 15 and the members' declarations.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, if I may, I mean, one of the 17 | rules of the School District is to promote dignity and respect and teach that in the educational environment, and that's all 19 these policies are designed to do. Yes, they track state law, which is encouraging school districts in this state to promote dignity and respect for others, and I think that's what we should be teaching our children. That said, obviously, we are 23 dealing with a First Amendment legal issue, but --

THE COURT: And I don't read what the School District 25 \parallel said as saying, we want to punish unpopular speech, but I

1 understand why Mr. Vitagliano and his clients are interpreting it that way. 2 3 You know, if I decided today that I didn't want to | call you Mr. Stern and Mr. Vitagliano, I wanted to call you 5 Ms. Stern and Ms. Vitagliano, you wouldn't like it very much, 6 but I guess, Mr. Vitagliano, you would say it's my right to do 7 that. MR. VITAGLIANO: Your Honor's courtroom. 8 9 THE COURT: Well, look, I don't have subject matter Ijurisdiction, so now we are just having an intellectual 11 discussion. 12 I'm denying the motion for a preliminary injunction, 13 and I am dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of 14 \parallel subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Do No Harm vs. Pfizer, 96 F.4th 106, and *Aquayo v. Richardson*, 473 F.2d 1090. I will do a short order saying that, and then you folks can go up to 17 the Second Circuit. Thank you both. 18 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. VITAGLIANO: 19 MR. STERN: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 -000-21 22 23 Certified to be a true and accurate transcript of the digital electronic recording to the best of my ability. 24 /s/ Darby Ginsberg U.S. District Court 25 Official Court Reporter

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